Plato and Heraclitus

I wrote this essay for an introductory philosophy course in university.

Here, I defend the notion that Plato’s Theory of Forms avoids skepticism brought about by the doctrine of universal flux. I will first explain the theory of universal flux followed by an explanation of Plato’s Theory of Forms. Then I will give an argument based on the theory that it avoids skepticism. A potential critic will argue why the theory of Forms does not answer the problem of skepticism. And then I will show why that critic is wrong.

What is Universal Flux?

Imagine you’re chasing a cat around your house. After a long chase in the living room, the bedroom, and the bathroom, it stops in the kitchen and you think to yourself, “I now know this cat is in the kitchen.” However, halfway through the thought it jumps back into the living room. So, you didn’t really know the cat was in the kitchen, because it’s no longer true. The cat’s position seems to be in flux.

Heraclitus proposed a doctrine, much like the cat’s position, that everything in the universe is in flux. This means that every object we perceive could never truly known because it’s constantly changing.

Plato’s Theory of Forms

If we are to say that the Theory of Forms refutes Heraclitus’ skepticism, we need to know what the Theory of Forms is in the first place. The first important aspect of the Theory of Forms is the idea of metaphysical dualism. That is, everything is divided into two realities: Physical and non-physical. That which is perceived by us are all included in the physical reality. This includes tables, chairs, dogs, cats, trees, etc. Non-physical objects are not perceived, and that which could never be perceived by anyone. This includes numbers, perfect shapes, and God i.e. a perfect being.

But there’s more to the Theory of Forms than the distinction between the physical and the non-physical. According to Plato, what ever is physical is an imperfect copy of a non-physical Form. To clarify, every Form is non-physical, but not every non-physical thing is a Form. The Forms can be thought of as perfections. Of course, it’s not easy to think of perfection, but we could at least grasp the idea by recognizing how something could be better and work to apply it to the object we are perceiving. For instance, the chair I’m sitting on could always be a bit more comfortable, a bit rounder, a bit greyer, etc. But it is not perfect so, according to Plato, the chair is a mere image of the perfect chair that exists in the realm of the Forms: The Chair.

What is Perfection?

So, we’ve established that the Theory of Forms proposes that the Forms are perfections of physical objects. Now we must ask ourselves, are the Forms subject to flux? To answer this, let’s reconsider The Chair. Could The Chair be a bit greyer? A bit more comfortable? A bit rounder? If we said yes to any of these questions, then we simply are not referring to The Chair. We are merely referring to an imperfect copy. By definition, The Chair has reached perfection in all its characteristics including comfortability. There’s no properties or characteristics of The Chair that could ever change, because of its perfection. Thus, we can conclude that The Chair will never be subject to flux because if it is, then it is no longer a Form. It is a mere image. If the Forms exist, then there are at least some objects that are not subject to flux.

The Main Argument

If flux is universal, then it is not the case that anything can be known. If it is not the case that anything can be known, then universal skepticism is true. So, Universal skepticism is true (apparently).

If there are at least some objects that are not subject to flux, then there are some objects that can be known. The Forms are not subject to flux. Therefore, there are some objects that can be known.

If there are some objects that can be known, then knowledge is possible if these objects can be grasped. If it’s possible that these objects can be grasped, then flux is not universal. It is possible that the Forms can be grasped. Thus, flux is not universal. 

If flux is not universal, then knowledge is possible. If knowledge is possible, then universal skepticism is false. So, universal skepticism is false.

The Main Objection

Flux may not be universal in the sense that both physical and non-physical objects are subject to flux. Let’s admit that the Forms are not subject to flux. So what? Your chair that you’re sitting on, this is still in flux. You can’t know anything about that particular chair. Everything you perceive is still going to be in flux. Because these are not Forms. To put it simply, all the physical objects you perceive are still in flux.

You haven’t solved the skeptical problem; you’ve merely tried to define your way out of it by a technicality of your theory. So, just like a man who stands at the starting line of a race and declares, “I’ve won! I’ve won!”  you likewise avoided the real problem rather than solve it.

Response to The Main Objection

Let’s first establish what we mean by universal flux. If it is true that flux is not universal in the sense that all objects are subject to flux, then we are restricting what we mean by “universal.” Ultimately, you’d be insisting that everything, but the Forms are in flux. I agree that the Forms aren’t in flux.

Now, let’s establish what we mean by skepticism. If we mean by skepticism that knowledge is not possible, then this is false because as long as the Forms exist, knowledge is possible. So, by agreeing that the Forms are not in flux, but insisting that everything else is, then skepticism is impossible.

But this is not interesting at all, because by all-practical matters, I want to know about the things that I am immediately perceiving. What use is to believe that knowledge is possible because The Chair exists? There must be some sort of relation, then, by which my perceiving The Chair leads to knowledge of the chair that I am sitting on.

According to the Theory of Forms, my chair is an imperfect copy of The Chair, even if it is in constant flux. I can recognize this fact no matter what state it’s in: be it at 1:00 pm or 1:01 pm. It will still be an imperfect copy of The Chair. Let’s now consider the fact that when I perceive my chair at 1:01 pm, I’m not learning anything new about it. I either know that it’s something at 1:01 pm or I don’t. If I knew about my chair at 1:01 pm, then there’s no need to learn it. But if I don’t know about my chair at 1:01 pm, then it’s impossible to learn about it. So, I am recalling the information of my chair.

This knowledge that I am recalling cannot come from a physical entity, because physical objects are finite. The knowledge must come from a source that exists from infinity. This source, which is ingrained in us, is what we might call ‘the soul.’ The soul exists prior to our birth, and it is non-physical. We know it exists because the opposite of life is death, and the opposite of death is life. As of now, I am living, thus, I must have come from death. And in order for me have come from death, I must have been alive. Thus, there must have been something non-physical existing prior to my birth which gave me life. We call this, the soul.

By means of this soul, we can bridge the gap between the Forms and the physical objects that I am perceiving because by my perceiving my chair, I am recalling The Chair. It does not matter what new physical state my chair might be in tomorrow, for I am constantly recalling The Chair each time I perceive it. So, knowledge about my chair is possible because of my constant recalling of The Chair.

Conclusion

It has been shown that Plato’s Theory of Forms avoids skepticism brought about by the doctrine of universal flux. The main objection to this notion was that while the Forms might make knowledge possible, but knowledge of immediately perceived objects was still doubted. Knowledge that there are Forms doesn’t mean we can know about the objects around us; flux is still a problem. I responded to the objection by arguing that the soul exists, acts as a mediator between the Forms and the objects by way of recollection, and thus, we inherently know about the objects because we are constantly recalling it.