Suppose you are single and waiting for that “special someone.” Perhaps what keeps you going is the idea that there is someone out there for you – like a soul mate. The man or woman of your dreams is out there and patiently waiting for you. It’s just a matter of time before you meet them!
Now, I will argue that this idea of soul mates (the one that is keeping you going) is entirely false! Here, I will expose your last hope by exploring the falsehood of soul mates. First, I define what a soul mate is. Then I show why any definition fails upon the use of contemporary modal logic. In turn, we’d have no reason to believe in these standard definitions of soul mates. Lastly, we look at an attempt to argue for soul mates via God’s divine foreknowledge. From this argument, we do derive a satisfactory definition of soul mates, but one that runs contrary to the common conceptions (i.e., traditional marriage). It’ll become clear that the typical hopeless romantic is not trained in basic modal logic.
Common definitions
First, we will consider a prima facie definition of soul mates. Typically, people feel “fated” to be with a person. Once they’ve met that special someone, it seems to them that some force beyond our understanding brought them together and that anyone else would have been a mistake. We will define it as such:
Definition 1: A soul mate is someone we were “fated” to be with. We couldn’t have ended up with anyone else in all possible worlds.
One of the key terms in this definition is fate. The notion of fate is often associated with a doctrine known as fatalism. (Although the average person bitten by the love bug isn’t likely to be thinking about this doctrine.) Fatalism is the idea that there’s already a truth value for all future events. For example, there’s already a truth value to whether you eat breakfast tomorrow. Or there’s a truth value to whether my cat will meow tomorrow at noon.
According to fatalism, along with future truth values already being established since the beginning of time, every event in history, and every willed action you commit, occurred by necessity. In contemporary modal logic, the notion of necessity means that a proposition or event occurred in “all possible worlds,” which is another one of our key terms. A possible world is a set of counterfactuals of how the universe could have been.
Argument from Common Sense
One of the first reasons we should be suspicious of fated soul mates is that the doctrine of fatalism is contrary to common sense. We needn’t get too deep into the debate on fatalism vs free will. Instead, by appealing to common sense, we ought to recognize that fatalism is much too radical and requires us to reject many of our commonsensical experiences. Our own common sense tells us that we could have walked to work instead of driving. You could have chosen to do some writing of your own instead of reading this essay. There was nothing that “fated” you to read this sentence right now. Fatalism also runs contrary to our moral intuitions and the determination of the blameworthiness or praiseworthiness of an action. Why praise a firefighter for saving a child’s life if they were fated to do so from the beginning? The first definition of soul mates already seems suspicious through our own experience. So much for commonsense fatalism!
How a Fatalist Might Respond
Perhaps the fatalist would argue that common sense is unreliable. After all, our common sense tells us the sun moves around the Earth rather than our point on the Earth spinning away from the sun. Or that common sense told people there were witches in Salem. But those who argue against common sense usually aren’t aware of contemporary philosophers who work within a framework of defeasibility. Defeasibility is a family of epistemological theories of justification that states that what seems to me to be the case is a justified belief until I am given a defeater for the belief.
A defeater is a statement or belief that either contradicts or significantly lowers the probability of another belief. For example, suppose I look at a clock and believe “It is now 1:00 pm.” However, the person next to me checks his phone and informs me that the clock is broken, and it is indeed 2:00 pm. This brand-new information about the clock, and also the testimony of a person with a functioning phone, both provide defeaters for the belief I initially had that it was 1:00 pm.
The fact that the sun looks like it’s moving doesn’t mean our common sense is unreliable. Instead, we can mostly rely on common sense for justification and filter more complex beliefs through reason and defeaters. Our contemporary knowledge of science serves as a defeater to the belief that the sun moves around the Earth. Our moral knowledge and our current knowledge about witches serve as defeaters for what might have seemed to us to be witches back during the Salem witch trials. (There may not have been as many witches as we once thought.)
The mere fact that our common sense may have led us to false beliefs isn’t itself a defeater against our use of common sense. But doesn’t our common sense still tell us we are “fated” to be with our lover? Perhaps… but don’t worry, I haven’t given up on ruining your hope with love!
A Logical Defeater Against Definition 1
Recall our first definition:
Definition 1: A soul mate is someone we were “fated” to be with. We couldn’t have ended up with anyone else in all possible worlds.
If we apply the notion of necessity to the two fated lovers, we get the following proposition:
A. Necessarily, there exist persons x and y such that x and y are soul mates.
This proposition is implausible, however. For starters, x and y (our star-crossed lovers) are contingent beings. A contingent being is an existent being that did not have to exist in at least one possible world. The fact that your mom didn’t have to exist automatically makes her a contingent being.
Let’s say that your mother is x and your father is y in proposition (A). Since they are both contingent beings, (A) is intrinsically false. There is only one way the proposition could be true:
B. x and y are metaphysically necessary.
However, the idea that your parents are metaphysically necessary would entail that they could never die. Yet, we all die. So, we have no reason to believe any star-crossed lovers, including your mom and dad, are metaphysically necessary. Thus, no reason to believe in (A).
De re necessity?
You may say that in all possible worlds where your parents do exist, they are soul mates, much like how it is necessary that I, Uriah, am a human being. Although I’m a contingent being, I am human in all possible worlds where I exist. And even in possible worlds where the soul mates don’t meet, they are still soul mates.
Previously, our definition relied on de dicto necessity, but this new approach appeals to de re necessity, which is more plausible but not foolproof. The distinction between de re and de dicto necessity is a distinction between the properties of things and properties of statements. A contingent thing is never necessary, but the properties that it possesses can be necessary for its existence. For example, my being a human is a necessary property for my existence. Without the property of human-ness, there is no Uriah.
Likewise, soul mates don’t need to be romantic partners in all possible worlds. Rather, the property of x and y being soul mates applies in all possible worlds where both x and y exist. Thus, x and y do not need to be metaphysically necessary, are allowed not to meet, and can even die before meeting, yet still be soul mates. The de re definition would look like this:
Definition 2: A soul mate is the necessary property of a bond between two people, so long as those two people exist.
It’s not so clear that we can know the proposition is true even if we are using de re necessity. I can know particular de re propositions like, “Jimmy is necessarily a human.” But it does not follow that one can know all de re propositions. But more on knowledge and justification later.
Similarities to the Modal Ontological Argument
The definition itself is susceptible to what is called a symmetry problem. To best understand what a symmetry problem is, we’ll draw similarities between arguments for our definition and the modal ontological argument for God’s existence:
1A. Possibly, a perfect being exists.
Therefore,
2A. Necessarily, there exists a perfect being. (Deduced via S5 Axiom)
3A. A perfect being exists in the actual world (Deduced from the necessity of (2A))
And the reason why we can deduce necessary existence from (1A) is that necessary existence is an intrinsic property of a perfect being. (The S5 axiom ensures that any X that is possibly necessary is necessary.) However, there’s the infamous reverse modal ontological argument to save the day for atheism:
1B. Possibly, it is not the case that there exists a perfect being.
Therefore,
2B. Necessarily, it is not the case that there exists a perfect being. (Deduced via S5 Axiom)
3B. A perfect being does not exist in the actual world. (Deduced from the necessity of (2B))
Premise (1A) of the modal ontological argument does not successfully refute atheism (3B) because it’s not true de dicto. Due to the de re nature of both premises (1A) and (1B), we run into a symmetry problem. To argue for the possibility of theism (1A) and thus, theism (3A), we would need a symmetry breaker, that is, a good reason to believe in the possibility of God. Without a symmetry breaker, we’d have no grounds to say either theism (3A) or atheism (3B) is true.
Likewise, we have two de re propositions concerning definition 2:
C. Possibly, the bond between x and y has the necessary property of soul mates.
D. Possibly, the bond between x and y does not have the necessary property of soul mates.
Clearly, we run into a symmetry problem. However, we have a clear symmetry breaker for (D) and against (C). The argument is an empirical one.
- All bonds within a relationship are ordered towards love in some sense, even the worst ones.
- If the bonds within these relationships are ordered towards love, then there is disorder whenever people act contrary to the proper order.
- So, there is disorder whenever people act contrary to the proper order. (From 1 and 2)
- If there is disorder within a bond whenever people act contrary to the proper order, then it is possible that the bond does not have the necessary property of soul mates.
- From what we observe, most relationships either fail or often have instances where people act contrary to the proper order. (Empirical premise)
- Thus, it is possible that the bond does not have the necessary property of soul mates. (From 3 – 5)
- So, we have better reason to believe (D) over (C). (From 6)
So much for the de re definition of soul mates!
Knowledge of Soul Mates
A love epistemologist (whatever that is) may state that the best approach to establishing whether one is your soul mate is by merely establishing that you are epistemically justified in the belief. There is no need for definitions and arguments, much like how I can’t argue that other minds around me exist. I just know and am justified in believing that other minds exist. So, one may argue that even if we can’t establish an argument for the existence of soul mates, we are nonetheless justified in the belief. These types of beliefs, like the belief in other minds, are called properly basic beliefs.
We cannot so easily refute the properly basic beliefs of another person. For example, suppose you get hit in the head with a hammer (evident by the large lump on your head). You would likely believe the proposition, ” I am in pain.” However, I cannot refute this proposition because I can never feel your pain. I can empathize with you, but I cannot say, “They aren’t in pain, because I do not feel it.” I also couldn’t use the colloquial definition of pain that logicians wouldn’t like. Likewise, I can’t deny the love so strong that one knows they are their soul mate; I can’t feel your love.
However, we must be careful to distinguish between the love one feels for a person and a soul mate. Even those who believe in soul mates also think it’s possible to fall in love multiple times, even simultaneously with numerous people. Like if one’s spouse dies, they might fall in love again and remarry. So, we can admit that the love your mom feels for your dad is properly basic, without also admitting your mom and dad are soul mates. The question then is whether we can show that the belief in soul mates is properly basic, rather than the belief that one is strongly in love, thus invoking a sense of “fate”.
As we’ve established, both definitions of soul mates fail. Unless we really weaken our definition of soul mates to something vague, like “strong compatibility,” the concept of soul mates has been defeated. Thus, one cannot be rationally justified. A properly basic belief, while itself does not need justification, cannot be susceptible to a defeater. So, it follows that a belief in a soul mate is not properly basic. Thus, one cannot know who one’s soul mate is, even if they are madly in love.
God’s Knowledge of Future Events
There’s no way that we can know someone is our soul mate (at least immediately), but perhaps we ought to appeal to a higher power. If God is all-knowing, and He is never wrong, then there is already a truth value to whether you marry someone or not. Thus, whether you like it or not, you are technically fated to be or not to be with a soul mate. The argument for fate through God’s foreknowledge would look something like this:
1. If God knows I marry Jessica, then, necessarily, Jessica and I are soul mates.
2. I married Jessica.
Therefore,
3. Necessarily, Jessica and I are soul mates.
This argument, however, commits a common modal fallacy known as confusing the necessitas consequentiae. This fallacy has been used by critics of Christianity who claim that God was being too mean to Judas Iscariot for making him “necessarily” betray Jesus. Of course, that argument is just as fallacious as the one above.
In the argument [Jessica and I are soul mates], it necessarily follows. But [necessarily, Jessica and I are soul mates], does not. Premise (3) should really be:
3C. Jessica and I are soul mates.
Soul Mates in Traditional Marriage
Despite my rejection of the de re definition of soul mates, the de re definition is fulfilled, so long as marriage is actualized. Meaning, it occurs in the actual world. Thus, the most satisfactory definition of soul mates is as follows:
Definition 3: A soul mate is the necessary property of a bond between a man and a woman, where the man and the woman are married.
By marriage, I do not mean strictly to Canadian law, but a covenant of love between man and woman under the eyes of God. Thus, the proposition (3C) is true, so long as (1) and (2) are also true. (On a fun note: I am of the radical position that two people remain soul mates even if they fall out of love, though love comes in many forms.)
If the act of marriage is freely accepted in the actual world between a man and a woman, the property of soul mates is applied to that marriage, but not to the man and the woman individually. So, Jessica did not have the property “Uriah is my soul mate” prior, during, or after the marriage. Instead, it is the marriage itself that has the property. This allows Jessica to remarry and receive a new soul mate if the marriage itself is invalid or is dissolved through my death.
So yes, there are soul mates if the truth of the conditional (if I married Jessica) is actualized. But no, even with the actualization of the conditional, no prior necessity is involved. It would thus seem one would have no good reason to believe that one is their soul mate before marriage. It is only after the act of marriage is actualized between a man and woman that one can know their soul mate.
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